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United States v Winstar ameliorates the non-simultaneity of
performance problem that impedes contracting between Con-
gress and special interest groups. In this case, a legislative bar-
gain enabled the thrift industry to capture its regulators, and
later led to private agreements in which government regula-
tors allowed thrift operators to violate generally accepted
accounting principles. After this resulted in so many undercap-
italized thrift institutions that the industry collapsed, Con-
gress abrogated these special-interest group bargains. Winstar
held that the government thereby incurred massive civil liabil-
ity. That outcome supports the Landes-Posner hypothesis that
the independent judiciary facilitates contracting between
Congress and interest groups. Winstar raises the value of the
deals that interest groups make with Congress by providing
them with durability, a result that is inconsistent with the
interests of disaggregated citizens (taxpayers) because it will
increase the frequency of wealth transfers from citizens gener-
ally to Congress and special-interest groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of bureaucracy is poorly understood in the public choice
literature. In particular,, there seems to be an acute lack of consensus
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about the extent to which legislators demand control over adminis-
trative agencies, the extent to which interest groups want legislative
control over agencies, and even the extent to which bureaucracies
themselves can be transformed into interest groups in their own
right.' Clearly, the correct starting point for analyzing bureaucracy
is from a principal-agent perspective.2 After all, Congress creates
administrative agencies, Congress funds administrative agencies,
and Congress can, if it chooses, eliminate administrative agencies.
But this seemingly simple structure masks a surprising degree of
real-world complexity. In particular, the agency relationship
between Congress and interest groups is characterized by three
important contracting problems. First, as in other principal-agent
relationships, the principals (politicians in Congress) cannot monitor
their agents costlessly. As with private citizens, it is expensive for
Members of Congress to inform themselves about the relevant issues
and to determine which outcome will maximize their political sup-
port from affected interest groups and constituents. 3 Second, at the
time a bureaucracy is created, interest groups may be more confident
of their ability to retain control over the agency than of their ability
to retain control over Congress.4 Where this is the case, winning
interest group coalitions will demand that Congress relinquish con-
trol over agencies. Thus, we should not expect Congress to make
an effort to minimize agency autonomy in all cases. Finally, and
most importantly from the perspective of this article, Congress's
views on a particular policy issue will change over time, as will the
relative political power of any particular interest group or coalition
of interest groups. In fact, changes in power of interest group coali-
tions are likely to cause the subsequent changes in congressional
preferences. Thus, monitoring and control of bureaucracies by subse-
quent political coalitions in Congress will not be a reliable tool
for protecting the political claims previously obtained by interest
groups.'
Seen from this perspective, the core problem facing interest groups
and politicians at the time that a legislative deal is made is how to
Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57
L & Contemp Probs 1, 7-11 (Spring 1994).
2 Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J L Econ & Org 243 (1987) ("McCub-
bins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures").
' Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administra-
tive Agencies, 8 J Law Econ & Org 93, 94 (1992) ("Macey, Organizational Design").
4 Id.
I Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency:
A Comment on Macey, 8 J L Econ & Org 111 (1992) ("Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift").
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create a bureaucratic structure that will give durability to whatever
agreement is reached. The more durable the deal, the more political
support interest groups will be willing to provide in exchange for a
politician's support.
This article analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United
States v Winstar from the perspective of the economic theory of
regulation. The case is of particular interest from an economic per-
spective because it considered the legal limits on the ability of Con-
gress to alter arrangements negotiated between administrative
agencies and private firms. The case provides an excellent opportu-
nity to study at close range the agency-cost problem facing Congress
and interest groups and the way that bureaucracies can be used to
mitigate that problem. In particular, the ability of a subsequent
Congress to renege on the legislative deals made by their predecessors
is of interest from a public choice perspective because it critically
affects the demand by interest groups for the laws promulgated by
Congress. To the extent that a subsequent Congress can renege on
previous legislative bargains, such bargains will be less valuable to
the relevant interest groups. And, of course, the same holds true for
deals made between interest groups and the bureaucrats (who are
congressional agents).
This article shows how each of the three critical characteristics
of congressional control over administrative agencies described
above-costly monitoring, direct control by interest groups over
bureaucrats, and coalitional drift-played a role in the Winstar case.
And, equally important, the article uses the Winstar decision to
illustrate the role played by the Supreme Court in the bargaining
game between Congress and interest groups.
In particular, the Winstar decision portrays the Court in the role of
outside guarantor of the durability of interest group bargains arranged
among Congress, administrative agencies, and the interest groups
themselves. From a public choice perspective, Winstar raises the
value of legislation engineered by interest groups by increasing its
durability, and this, in turn, will lead to an increase in the demand
for such legislation on the part of special interest groups. From the
perspective of the public interest, the decision in Winstar is rather
disturbing. The decision will lead to more "amorally redistributive"
wealth transfers from citizens generally to Congress and members
of special interest groups.
Part II describes the basic features of public choice theory that
are necessary to understand the analysis in this article. Part III com-
6 116 S Ct 2432 (1996).
HeinOnline  -- 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 175 1998
176 Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice
pletes the background by describing the particular regulatory envi-
ronment that led up to the Winstar decision. Part IV describes the
decision itself, and Part V analyzes the decision from the perspective
of the well-known debate about the role of the independent judiciary
in protecting the durability of interest group bargains with bureau-
crats and legislators. In Part VI, I examine an alternative available
to the judiciary that would raise rather than lower the transaction
costs of rent-seeking. By either interpreting legislation in a manner
that shapes it into only a public-regarding statute, or by invalidating
statutes, in whole or in part, where they serve only private interests
at the expense of the public, the judiciary will decrease the durability
of legislative bargains and thereby make investment in rent-seeking
less attractive. Raising the costs of rent-seeking would serve the
public interest by reducing the level of wealth transfers and other
welfare-reducing misallocations of resources.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE, DURABILITY, AND
SIMULTANEITY OF PERFORMANCE
The theory of public choice, also known as the economic theory of
legislation, makes the same basic assumptions about self-interest
for politicians and bureaucrats that standard economic analysis
makes for private sector actors. Thus, public choice theory views
regulation as a commodity like any other. As Richard Posner has
observed, "the interest group theory asserts that legislation is a good
demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from
it, regardless of overall social welfare."' According to the public
choice theory of legislation, market forces provide strong incentives
for self-interested politicians to enact laws that serve private rather
than public interests because, over a wide range of issues, these
private groups can provide politicians and bureaucrats with the polit-
ical support they need to serve their objectives of achieving re-elec-
tion, or of maximizing their bureaucratic turf. In a nutshell, public
choice theory posits that laws and regulations are supplied by law-
makers and bureaucrats to the political groups or coalitions that
outbid competing groups.
Public choice theory has attracted a wide variety of adherents
among welfare state liberals and Marxists, as well as among free-
market economists. In general there has been a "shift in scholarly
I Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U Chi L Rev 263, 265 (1982).
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thinking about legislation from a rather naive faith in the public-
interest character of most legislation to a more realistic understand-
ing of the importance of interest groups in the legislative process." 8
The widespread acceptance of public choice theory is linked to
increasing suspicion about much of what Congress does.
The public choice literature has attempted to specify more pre-
cisely the process by which organized special interest groups obtain
rules that transfer wealth from weaker political coalitions to them-
selves. Concentrated interest groups demand special benefits for
themselves. Individual citizens and less organized groups supply this
legislation by paying the taxes and incurring the costs of complying
with the regulations that transfer wealth to such groups. Politicians
act as brokers between these two groups and as entrepreneurs. The
politicians' goal is to maximize their own political support, most
obviously by passing legislation designed to appeal to particular
groups. The politicians, however, can also use more creative tools.
They can, for example, define issues around which newly formed
groups can coalesce, and they can devise laws that overcome the
organizational obstacles of high information costs and transaction
costs (such as free rider problems) among interest group members
that plague wealth-transfer seeking interest groups. 9
While interest groups compete in a political marketplace, legisla-
tive institutions behave like private-sector firms whose output is
law. As such, the theory of the firm, rather than the theory of market
exchange, guides the public choice analysis of legislative institutions
such as Congress.'0 Like all firms, Congress organizes its internal
affairs to minimize the costs of assuring contractual performance.
Perhaps the most acute bargaining problems facing politicians
are those arising from non-simultaneity of performance. Politicians
generally will attempt to obtain political support from interest
groups before an election, but will not be able to "pay for" this
political support by supporting legislation favored by the interest
group until after the election. Interest groups therefore have reason
to worry that politicians will renege on their promises of support.
Conversely, incumbent politicians often will be called upon to pro-
vide political support for a particular bill favored by an interest group
in exchange for a promise of future support by the interest group.
I Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 271 (Harvard, 1985);
see also Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 Am Econ Rev 279 (1984).
9 Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of
Market Exchange, 74 Cornell L Rev 43 (1988) ("Macey, Public Choice").
'0 See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386, 394 (1937).
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Politicians therefore have reason to worry that the groups will renege
on their promises.
The most serious simultaneity of performance problem results
from the fact that, even after an interest group has succeeded in
achieving enactment of a particular statute, there can be no promise
that future legislators will not renege on the previously agreed upon
legislative deal, particularly if the original configuration of interest
groups loses power.
Much of the "industrial organization" of Congress is designed to
deal with this simultaneity of performance problem. Congress has
a strong incentive to resolve this problem because it would otherwise
be difficult for Congress to make a credible commitment to an inter-
est group that a particular legislative scheme will have the crucial
characteristic of durability. More durable statutes and regulations
will be worth more to politicians than less durable statutes and
regulations because interests groups are willing to pay for durability.
The basic way that Congress and regulators deal with this non-
simultaneity of performance problem is by making it difficult to
pass legislation in the first place. The more difficult it is to pass
legislation, the more difficult it will be to repeal legislation. In addi-
tion, the committee system was arguably developed in order to con-
centrate legislative power in the hands of a small number of people
who would be closely linked to the interest groups associated with
particular legislation. Thus, congressmen from farm states (and,
more recently, from districts heavily populated by food stamp recipi-
ents) are disproportionately represented on the agricultural commit-
tees in Congress. This, in turn, means that as long as the farm
lobby controls the congressmen from the farm states and the natural
alliance between farmers and food stamp recipients holds, these
interests will be able to block the introduction of legislation adverse
to them.
These types of rules permit congressmen to make credible com-
mitments to interest groups that laws passed now will survive in
future legislative sessions. Similarly, the bicameral legislature, exec-
utive veto, and independent judiciary all address this non-simultane-
ity of performance problem by moving the voting rules for passing
new laws closer to a unanimity requirement, thus making laws
difficult to modify once enacted.11
Politicians can also establish administrative agencies to make
legislation more durable. Administrative agencies make legislation
" James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (U Mich, 1966).
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durable by creating a stable of professional bureaucrats whose own
futures are inextricably linked to the maintenance of a particular
regulatory regime. Thus, for example, the securities laws and the
banking laws benefit certain industry participants both by creating
barriers to new entry, and by creating other rigidities favorable to
incumbents. These laws also created significant bureaucratic struc-
tures that have made reform and repeal of these laws surprisingly
difficult.
The preferences of the majority of voters are virtually irrelevant
in determining legislative outcomes when viewed within the public
choice framework. Instead, law is made by legislators whose primary
goal is to aggregate the political support they receive from competing
special interest group coalitions, and legal rules are generated by a
process that conforms to standard microeconomic models of ratio-
nally self-interested behavior.
Political scientists have used the terms "coalitional drift" and
"bureaucratic drift" to describe with more precision how non-simul-
taneity of performance problems between politicians and interest
groups can arise. Bureaucratic drift describes the problem where
the high costs of monitoring and controlling bureaucracies leads to
situations in which bureaucrats will act in ways inconsistent with
the original deal or "coalitional arrangement" struck between inter-
est groups and politicians.12 Coalitional drift describes the con-
tracting problem caused by fluctuations in the preferences of the
electorate and shifts in the preferences of politicians. The problem
of coalitional drift manifests itself when Congress wishes to undo
deals struck between interest groups and prior legislatures. 3
Generally speaking, the cure for bureaucratic drift is ex post con-
trol over bureaucratic behavior by congressional subcommittees,
oversight by specialized agencies such as the Congressional Budget
Office and the General Accounting Office, and reliance on interest
group notification. This oversight is supplemented by legal require-
ments that agencies provide information about themselves to their
political watchdogs. 4 Similarly, micro rules (like the prohibition on
ex parte communication that enables politicians, but not interest
groups, to gain direct one-way access to administrators) and macro
rules (like congressional control over agency funding) permit politi-
12 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures at 255 (cited in note
2).
l* Murray J. Horn and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies," 75 Va L Rev 499 (1989).
" Macey, Organizational Design at 95 (cited in note 3).
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cians to control bureaucratic drift.'I The bottom line is that Congress
and interest groups structure the administrative process in order to
permit interest groups to preserve the benefits of the prior deals they
have struck in the face of recalcitrant bureaucrats. The lesson of
bureaucratic drift is that when bureaucrats misbehave, Congress has
the ability to respond in a wide variety of ways.
But what happens when Congress lacks the will to respond? This
is the problem of coalitional drift, which describes what happens
when Congress's own preferences change. The danger to legislator-
interest group dealmaking that this will occur is much more serious
than the danger that Congress will be willing, but unable, to control
behavior by bureaucrats that they find undesirable. As Shepsle has
observed, over some range of administrative outcomes, efforts to
control bureaucratic drift by empowering Congress to micro-manage
agencies will exacerbate the problem of coalitional drift. The more
that Congress and congressional staff are free to interject themselves
in the bureaucratic decision process, the smaller the problem of
bureaucratic drift, but the greater the problem of coalitional drift.
The more independent the administrative agency, the smaller the
problem of coalitional drift, but the greater the problem of bureau-
cratic drift. 6
To some extent, both of these problems can be ameliorated simul-
taneously by structural decisions about the administrative agencies
themselves. Initial agency structure and design can reduce coali-
tional drift and bureaucratic drift simultaneously by ensuring that
particular interest groups will receive the funding needed to remain
strong, thereby enabling such coalitions to maintain their control
over Congress, thus preventing coalitional drift. Initial agency design
can likewise prevent bureaucratic drift by creating a specialized
bureaucratic structure in which bureaucrats have a single clientele-
like the savings and loan industry. This, in turn, creates a situation
in which bureaucratic drift is unlikely since interest groups will
capture the administrative agency, fill it with their own nominees,
and then run it as a personal fiefdom. This not only helps ensure
the fidelity of the administrative agency, but also the longevity and
continued vitality of the interest group as well.
Of course, this happy outcome (from the interest group's perspec-
tive) is not inevitable. Where, as in the savings and loan situation,
the perverse incentives created by a particular regulatory structure
Is McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures (cited in note 2).
16 Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift (cited in note 5).
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are simply overwhelming, the system can collapse under its own
weight, ruining both the agency and the industry it was designed to
protect. The story of the savings and loan industry and its capture
of the thrift regulators represents a textbook case of the way Congress
can exert ex ante control over the outcomes generated by an adminis-
trative agency. Congress accomplishes this by controlling the ability
of other outside groups to exert political pressure on the agency and
by reducing the incentive of other groups to form opposition to the
agency's behavior.
Congress did not have to create a single regulator for the thrift
industry. It could have consolidated thrift regulation with banking
regulation generally. In creating a single-interest-group agency, Con-
gress ensured the capture of the agency by the group. By contrast,
where the original legislative enactment involves an administrative
agency which allows access to a broad cross-section of groups, cap-
ture by a single group is much less likely. Thus, the creation of
single-interest administrative agencies is one mechanism legislators
use to promote deals that have a significant degree of durability.
III. THE SAVINGS & LOAN CRISIS
The background leading up to the Winstar case is relatively simple.
Interest groups gained virtually complete control over an administra-
tive agency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. This dominance
manifested itself in the creation of a regulatory environment that
first permitted, and then rewarded, risk-taking by operators of feder-
ally insured savings and loan institutions. In particular, the flat-rate
deposit insurance scheme existing until 1991 did not include risk-
adjusted premiums, thereby creating acute moral hazard. Sharehold-
ers of savings and loan associations had strong incentives to invest
in high-risk, high-return projects. In the rare cases when such projects
turned out well, the shareholders would reap the rewards. When the
projects failed, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), and then, after the insolvency of the FSLIC, the U.S. tax-
payer, absorbed the vast majority of the losses. Later, the large,
uninsured but politically sophisticated depositors in these insolvent
savings and loan institutions convinced the thrift regulators to
refrain from closing failed S&Ls. The FSLIC bailed out virtually all
of the creditors of failed S&Ls by merging the assets and deposits
with other institutions.
These deals were structured to involve virtually no risk to acquir-
ing institutions. First, many mergers gave acquirors "put options"
in the form of promises by regulators that required the FSLIC to
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repurchase assets (loans) acquired in mergers if those assets later
went into default. 7 For other assets, the FSLIC guaranteed a certain
rate of return to the acquiror under so-called "yield maintenance"
agreements. These agreements assured acquirors a substantial rate
of return on any assets not resold to the FSLIC. 8
In other words, the deals made between the FSLIC and acquirors
of failed thrifts generally were structured to involve no risk to the
acquiror. Worse, the deals were structured so as to minimize current
outlays by the FSLIC, but to impose massive future contingent liabil-
ities on the agency. These massive future liabilities ultimately bank-
rupted and then destroyed the FSLIC: the agency was eliminated
and its insurance function was transferred to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. For years, Congress "acquiesced to FSLIC
policies in return for political support from S&Ls across the West
and Southwest."'19
From a political perspective, Congress's initial organizational
design of the bureaucratic infrastructure of the S&L industry was
hugely successful. Even after the industry was bankrupt, its faithful
bureaucracy continued slavishly to serve its interests. The regulators
protected all industry participants-operators of failed thrifts, credi-
tors of failed thrifts and acquirors of failed thrifts-at a huge ultimate
cost to the general public. One wonders what the role of the indepen-
dent federal judiciary was-or should have been-in all of this. One
answer to that puzzle emerged in the Winstar case.
IV. WINSTAR
One of the more creative devices employed by thrift regulators
involved incentives given to thrifts acquiring other, failed thrifts at
the height of the S&L crisis. The situation addressed in Winstar was
caused by a dramatic case of the sort of coalition drift described
above. The coalition drift came from two sources. First, the collapse
of the S&L industry itself by definition sapped the industry of
resources, and thereby reduced the industry's ability to lobby Con-
gress. Second, and more important, the huge costs of the S&L bailout
to taxpayers, coupled with several high-profile scandals involving
thrift institutions (investigations of the "Keating Five" senators and
,1 Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 Duke L J
469, 539-40 n 256 (1992).18 FDIC Policy Eases GAO Concerns About Review of 1988 FSLIC Deals, 55 BNA
Banking Rep 149 J1990).
19 Jonathan R. Macey, Savings & Loan Regulations Create "Win-Win" Situation
for Risk-Takers, LA Times M3 (Feb 5, 1989).
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the resignations of Congressman Tony Coehlo and House Speaker
Jim Wright all were related to thrift industry scandals), transformed
the former backwater of S&L regulation into a highly salient political
issue.
This, in turn, led to the dismantling of the pre-existing regulatory
infrastructure that previously had governed the thrift industry. In
its place, Congress passed new regulations that greatly reduced the
discretion of regulators to transfer wealth from taxpayers to bankers.
In particular, Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) to respond to many of the
failed regulatory strategies that led to the thrift crisis. FDICIA
reflects a "renewed focus on responsibility and discipline" in the
finance of U.S. depository institutions by reducing the discretion of
regulators, imposing market discipline in the bank failure context,
and ameliorating the moral hazard problems that plague bank equity
claimants.20
As noted above, regulators protected thrift operators by responding
to insolvencies in a dilatory manner. Thrift regulators avoided
"prompt corrective action"-i.e. the prompt closing of insolvent and
near-insolvent insured financial institutions-despite the fact that
early closure would have produced substantial savings for both the
FSLIC insurance fund and taxpayers. These savings would have
resulted from prompt action because it would have prevented both
the deterioration of the value of thrift assets and an increase in the
amount of thrift liabilities during the period immediately preceding
regulatory intervention.
The moral hazard facing bank equity claimants causes assets to
decline in value and liabilities to increase in value as insolvency
approaches. This is because shareholders of insured depository insti-
tutions have incentives to take risks as their equity position deterio-
rates: losses will be disproportionately borne by the debt-holders
(including the FSLIC) while gains will accrue to the shareholders.
As Robert Litan and Jonathan Rauch observe, FDICIA
requires regulators to impose progressively sterner sanctions if
the capital ratios of the institutions they supervise fall below the
mandated minimum. Significantly, regulators are authorized (by
FDICIA) to seize control of a weakened bank or thrift even before
it is economically insolvent. ... These "prompt corrective
actions" reverse the failed policy of "regulatory forbearance"
practiced in the 1980s and send a powerful signal to the owners
20 Robert E. Litan and Jonathan Rauch, American Finance for the 21st Century
27-31 (US Dept of the Treasury, 1997).
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of banks and thrifts that they will pay a price if they extend their
risk-taking further than their capital safely will allow1.2
FDICIA also addressed the moral hazard problem facing thrift equity
claimants by requiring the FDIC (the successor agency to the FSLIC)
to charge insured depository institutions insurance premiums that
are linked to the riskiness of the institutions. This provides insured
depository institutions for the first time in regulatory history with an
incentive to refrain from excessive risk-taking. Prior to FDICIA, the
flat-rate insurance premiums paid by thrifts permitted thrift operators
to transfer wealth from the federal insurer (and thus the taxpaying
public) to themselves by increasing bank riskiness (volatility).2
Putting aside the issue of agency capture, another problem with
the way that depository institution failures were resolved prior to
FDICIA was that the law did not take account of the fact that thrift
regulators themselves had strong bureaucratic incentives to delay
recognition of bank failures, even in the absence of political pressure
by politicians and interest groups. This is because regulators' perfor-
mance is evaluated by the press and congressional oversight commit-
tees in ways that impose perverse incentives on regulators.
Specifically, regulators are evaluated on the basis of their ability to
maintain the dollar balance of the insurance fund for which they
are responsible during their tenures in office.2 And regulatory perfor-
mance is similarly evaluated by comparing the raw number of bank
or thrift failures during one regulator's administration with the num-
ber of failures during prior periods. Both measures create incentives
for regulators to deny the severity of problems in the institutions
they regulate and to avoid prompt corrective action: criticism comes
when there is an increase in the number of failed banks and when
payouts reduce the balance in the insurance fund.
FDICIA sought a general and long-term solution to the structural
problems brought to light by the S&L crisis. The first steps in this
direction had been taken by the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), which made major
changes in the regulation of the banking industry in general and
thrift institutions in particular. FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and
transferred its functions to other agencies. FIRREA also created a
new thrift deposit insurance fund under the supervision of the FDIC
21 Id at 30.
2 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and
the Market for Bank Control, 88 Colum L Rev 1153 (1988).
23 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law and Regulation 280-
83 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1997) ("Macey & Miller, Banking Law").
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and replaced the primary thrift regulator, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, with the Office of Thrift Supervision, a Treasury Depart-
ment office with responsibility for the regulation of all federally
insured savings associations. And FIRREA created the Resolution
Trust Corporation which had responsibility for liquidating or other-
wise disposing of the assets of closed thrifts.
FIRREA gave rise to the underlying cause of action in the Winstar
case by obligating the newly created Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS) to "prescribe and maintain uniformly applicable capital stan-
dards for savings associations" in accord with strict statutory require-
ments. Specifically, the statute required thrifts to "maintain core
capital in an amount not less than 3 percent of the savings associa-
tion's total assets124 and defined core capital specifically so as to
exclude "unidentifiable intangible assets" such as good will." As the
legislative history of FIRREA made clear, these provisions responded
directly to the fact that "[t]o a considerable extent, the size of the
thrift crisis resulted from the utilization of capital gimmicks that
masked the inadequate capitalization of thrifts.1
26
FIRREA responded to the lawless and corrupt accounting practices
utilized by thrift regulators under the auspices of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board. The requirement that a federally insured deposi-
tory institution retain adequate capital is one of the few and perhaps
"the most powerful source of (market) discipline for financial institu-
tions." 27 Capital requirements are an important source of market
discipline for banks because it reduces shareholders' moral hazard
by requiring shareholders to bear some of the consequence of risky
activities (along with fixed claimants such as the FSLIC or the FDIC).
At the limit, when a firm receives all of its funding in the form of
capital (equity) and has no debt, there is no moral hazard problem
at all, since the shareholders fully internalize all losses to the firm.
At the other limit, when a firm is funded with all debt and no (or
virtually no) equity, the moral hazard problem is ubiquitous: fixed
claimants (i.e. the government in its capacity as guarantor of depos-
its) bear all of the losses, while the equity claimants reap any and
all of the gains that might accrue from risky ventures. This is the
state of affairs that characterized the bank mergers condoned by
thrift regulators prior to the passage of FIRREA.
12 USC § 1464(t)(2)(A) (1994).
15 12 USC § 1464(t)(9)(A) (1994).
26 HR Rep No 101-54(I), 101st Cong, 1st Sess 310 (1989), reprinted in 1989 USCCAN
86, 106.
27 Richard C. Breeden, Thumbs on the Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices
Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 Fordham L Rev S71, S75 (1991).
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Narrowly construed, the Winstar case addresses the issue of
whether the government's agreement to offer favorable (and fictional)
accounting treatment to the capital created by a merger consum-
mated under the auspices of government regulators is legally enforce-
able. If the promises made in these shady government deals are
legally enforceable, then the government is liable for damages when
Congress abrogates these agreements, as it did in FIRREA. In Win-
star, the Supreme Court held that the government is liable for dam-
ages, but left open the vitally important question of how such
damages are to be calculated. Damages estimates range in the billions
of dollars.
This case provides an important historical account of the FSLIC's
handling (or mishandling) of the savings and loan crisis. The shift to
"regulatory accounting principles" (RAP), as distinct from "generally
accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) was a major part of FSLIC's
strategy to avoid or put off the day of reckoning for the fact that a
large portion of the thrift industry, and the FSLIC fund itself, was
deeply under water.
The case turns on accounting principles that, while somewhat
arcane, warrant some attention. The government's approach
involved a manipulation of the standard accounting technique used
in mergers. This standard accounting approach, well recognized and
perfectly legitimate under GAAP, is called the "purchase method"
of accounting. The purchase method of accounting works as follows.
Suppose a Savings & Loan has the following (radically simplified)
balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
$100 tangible assets $75 debt
$25 net worth
At any particular point in time, this balance sheet may not accurately
reflect the true value of the firm, because the dollar value for the
assets on the balance sheet will be entered at their historical acquisi-
tion cost and then adjusted (amortized and depreciated) under a set
of assumptions that may not reflect changes in their actual value
over time. For example, in the case of real estate, it might be the
case that the assets are worth more than historical cost accounting
reflects because the real estate market has performed well.
Suppose that this hypothetical thrift institution is acquired in a
merger for $50, despite the fact that the book value of the thrift's
assets is only $25. While it is possible that the buyer has overpaid,
such an outcome is unlikely in an arms-length transaction between
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two sophisticated parties. More likely, the buyer has paid above
book value because the assets are worth more than the historical
accounting value ($100) shown on the books.
The purchase method of accounting commonly used in mergers
provides opportunities for acquirors to present a more realistic pic-
ture of the post-acquisition value of their firm by allowing such
acquirors to record the excess price that they have paid over book
value as a new asset, "goodwill." Under purchase method account-
ing, the value of the thrift institution's balance sheet following the
merger looks like this:
Assets Liabilities and Net Worth
$100 tangible assets $75 debt
$25 good will $50 net worth
Absent this accounting treatment, it would appear as though the
acquiror had overpaid for this thrift institution. Purchase method
accounting permits acquirors to adjust the balance sheets of the
thrift institutions they acquire in order to make them reflect the
true, market value of the firms they acquire.
However, goodwill is like other assets in that its value can change
over time. In particular, because goodwill reflects (in addition to
increases in the value of tangible assets) such intangible items as the
value of employee morale, the quality of its workforce, the benefit of
a favorable reputation, etc., the value of these items will deteriorate
in value over time unless the firm expends resources to maintain
them. Consequently, good accounting practice requires that the
value of goodwill be amortized-written down-over some period
of time.
The regulatory accounting principles used in FSLIC assisted merg-
ers were essentially a bastardized form of purchase value accounting.
The FSLIC's approach, which was designed to move troubled thrifts
into the hands of (often politically well-connected) acquirors at the
lowest possible price, deviated substantially from GAAP accounting.
In particular, in using the purchase method of accounting in accor-
dance with GAAP, the recognition of goodwill as an asset makes
sense because "a rational purchaser in a free market, after all, would
not pay a price for a business in excess of the value of that business's
assets unless there actually were some intangible 'going concern'
value that made up the difference."28
28 United States v Winstar, 116 S Ct 2432, 2442 (1996) (citing Martin Lowy, High
Rollers-Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle 39 (Praeger, 1991)).
HeinOnline  -- 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 187 1998
188 Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice
By contrast, in the deals engineered by the thrift regulators, there
was in reality no asset that could be called goodwill. The present
market value of the assets of these thrifts was lower, considerably
lower, than the present value of their liabilities. That is why they
were insolvent. These assisted mergers were transactions in which
a solvent institution would acquire an insolvent savings and loan
in so-called "purchase and assumption transactions" in which the
solvent institution was supposed to acquire the assets and assume
the liabilities of the troubled institution. Where the value of the
liabilities is greater than the value of the assets, no willing acquiror
will come forward to make the acquisition unless somebody is will-
ing to make up the difference between the value of the liabilities
and the value of the assets.
Because the FSLIC lacked the political will to close these insolvent
institutions, it used accounting gimmicks and regulatory forbearance
to induce healthy firms to acquire sick thrifts. This favorable
accounting treatment substantially reduced the amounts FSLIC
needed to pay the acquiring firms to make thrift acquisitions. In
essence, these transactions were fraudulent because they allowed
acquiring financial institutions to create a fictional asset (interest-
ingly called "supervisory goodwill": these acquirors certainly
enjoyed the goodwill of their regulatory supervisors), and to record
this "asset" on its balance sheet. This fictional accounting served
a number of purposes. First, thrift regulators let these acquiring
institutions count this "supervisory goodwill" toward their reserve
requirements, thereby allowing acquirors to increase their leverage,
making more and more loans on less and less capital, thereby dramat-
ically increasing the loss exposure to the government sponsored
FSLIC insurance fund. More important, this accounting treatment
was necessary to make these acquisition transactions possible in the
first place: absent the accounting gimmicks, the financial institu-
tions created as a result of these mergers would have been insolvent
immediately because of their lack of capitalization.
The favorable accounting treatment manifested itself in other
ways besides allowing the "supervisory goodwill" of an assisted
merger to be counted towards the institution's regulatory capital (on
the right side of the balance sheet), thereby allowing the institution
to make more loans under the capital adequacy guidelines. Even
more important was the fact that the FSLIC allowed the acquiring
firm to write down (amortize) the value of this fictitious "goodwill"
at a much slower pace than is generally permissible.29
29 Winstar, 116 S Ct at 2443-46.
HeinOnline  -- 6 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 188 1998
Jonathan R. Macey 189
Specifically, acquiring thrifts were permitted to write down the
value of this good will at a slower pace than they were writing up
the value of their loans. These loans, it should be noted, were worth
much less than face value because they paid low interest, but were
increasing in value because they were approaching maturity. And
as they approached maturity, a lower percentage of their total value
consisted of interest payments and a higher percentage of their total
value consisted of the value of the principle repayment owed at
maturity. As noted by the Winstar Court, these two items-the
increase in value of the loan portfolio and the decrease in value of
the supervisory goodwill-almost exactly offset each other as an
economic matter; but from an accounting standpoint, the faster rate
of increase in loan portfolio value meant that the acquiring institu-
tion could show a substantial paper profit during the early years
(although it would have to pay the piper later on).30 Finally, FSLIC
allowed acquiring firms to double count the amount of FSLIC's cash
contribution, thus artificially increasing both assets and net worth.
3 1
It is important to understand the consequences of these account-
ing gimmicks. First, they allowed the thrift regulators to disguise
the true dimensions of the thrift problems. Second, by postponing
the ultimate resolution of these insolvent thrifts, the thrift regulators
greatly increased the final resolution costs as losses continued to
mount. Third, by creating a whole new set of merged financial insti-
tutions with little or no real capital, the thrift regulators also com-
pounded the costs of the thrift bailout by increasing the already
high level of moral hazard within the industry. And, finally, these
transactions transferred considerable wealth from a highly disaggre-
gated group-the U.S. taxpayers, who were the ultimate guarantors of
the FSLIC insurance fund-to the highly concentrated and politically
well-connected creditors and acquirors of failed thrifts.
Acquiring firms were not so naive as to ignore the controversial,
indeed lawless, nature of these transactions. As early as 1983, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, which is the group responsi-
ble for promulgating GAPP, had issued Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards ("SFAS") 72 which applied specifically to the
acquisitions of savings and loan associations.3 2 This Statement made
it absolutely clear that not only was the creation of "supervisory
goodwill" out of whole cloth inconsistent with generally accepted
accounting principles, but also that the differential amortization
30 Id at 2444.
31 Id at 2444-45.32Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Stan-
dards No. 72 (Fin Accounting Stds Bd, 1983).
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periods for goodwill3 and the double accounting of capital3 4 were
inconsistent with standard accounting procedures.
Certainly before, but without a doubt after, the promulgation
of these accounting rules, specifically addressed to the accounting
treatment of the acquisition of insolvent thrifts in mergers receiving
the assistance of regulatory agencies, acquirors knew that there was
something very wrong with the regulatory treatment of these merg-
ers. In particular, acquirors well understood that there were political
risks associated with these deals. Accordingly, acquirors demanded
and received the government's contractual promise to give them
this favorable accounting treatment.
By 1989, however, the political climate was much different. The
public was outraged by the scandals and above all by the huge and
mounting costs imposed on them by the mishandling of the thrift
industry. Congress was highly sensitive to charges of political favor-
itism and cronyism on the part of politicians and regulators towards
shady thrift operators. Congress viewed the use of "regulatory
accounting" as an important part of the overall pattern of fraud and
mismanagement that created the savings and loan crisis in the first
place. When Congress withdrew the favorable accounting treatment
by passing FIRREA, it had an immediate and grave impact on a large
number of thrifts. With the elimination of this bogus accounting
treatment, these thrifts were suddenly moved from a position of
solvency to a position of non-compliance with regulatory capital
standards. And FIRREA demanded that insolvent financial institu-
tions be closed promptly unless they could be recapitalized through
the injection of substantial amounts of new equity.
V. WINSTAR AND THE ROLE OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT IN PROTECTING
INTEREST-GROUP DEALS
FIRREA caused failure or grave damage to a substantial number
of thrift operators who had acquired failing savings and loans in
supervisory mergers during the previous decade. In Winstar, the
3 SFAS 72 provides that "if and to the extent that, the fair value of liabilities
assumed exceeds the fair value of identifiable assets acquired in the acquisition of a
banking or thrift institution, the unidentifiable intangible assets shall be amortized
to expense by the interest method over a period of time no longer than the discount
on the long-term interest-bearing assets acquired .. "
I4 SFAS 72, paragraph 9 requires that financial assistance from regulatory authori-
ties must be deducted from the cost of the acquisition before the amount of goodwill
is determined.
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Supreme Court resolved one key element of the dispute over those
losses: the government is liable for reneging on the promises made
by thrift regulators to thrift operators. The Court remanded to the
lower courts the next phase of the dispute, determination of the
amount of the government's liability in the many pending cases.
The amount of the government's exposure is presently unknown,
but certainly will run into the billions of dollars.
In Winstar, the Court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the
agreements between failed thrifts and the regulators were contrac-
tual in nature, and that these accounting gimmicks were a sina qua
non for the mergers:
[W]e have no doubt that the parties intended to settle regulatory
treatment of these transactions as a condition of their
agreement. We accordingly have no reason to question the
Court of Appeals's conclusion that "the government had an
express contractual obligation to permit [Glendale Federal
Bank, FSB, one of the thrifts involved in the consolidated Win-
star litigation] to count the supervisory goodwill generated as a
result of its merger with Broward as a capital asset for regulatory
capital purposes."3
The Winstar case has often been characterized as involving the sim-
ple issues of whether there were contractual relationships between
thrift operators and the government, and whether the government
should be liable for the consequences of its failure to perform its
contractual promises. This is not true. The more interesting issue
in the case was who was contractually obligated under these
agreements to bear the risks of loss associated with subsequent
changes in regulation, not whether contractual relationships existed
between thrift operators and government regulators.
Nothing in the contracts between these thrifts and the govern-
ment purported to bar the government from changing the way the
thrift industry was regulated.36 That is why there was an issue as to
who was required to bear the risk of loss from such a change. The
plurality opinion relegated to a footnote the critical fact that the
agreements were ambiguous with respect to this vital issue .3 As the
Court noted in this footnote, in light of the size and importance of
these transactions, such ambiguity was "surprising."
The government relied heavily on the principle that contracts
limiting the government's future exercises of regulatory authority
35 Winstar, 116 S Ct at 2449-50 (citations omitted).
36 Id at 2452.
31 Id at 2452 n 15.
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are strongly disfavored.3 8 The Court dismissed this argument on the
ground that the contracts between the thrift regulators and the thrift
operators did not limit the government's ability to exercise its regula-
tory authority since the government could modify its regulations,
subject, of course, to liability for damages for any breach of contract
involved in such a modification.39
This analysis camouflages a couple of key points. First, raising
the costs of something, especially by billions of dollars, reasonably
will be expected to curtail the supply. Thus, raising the cost of
enacting a statute like FIRREA by billions of dollars reasonably will
be expected to curtail the supply of such statutes. And, as suggested
above, FIRREA was not an ordinary statute. It was designed to root
out mismanagement and corruption. The statute accomplished this
not only by eliminating these accounting gimmicks, but also by
eliminating the agencies responsible for the problem in the first
place.
The Court defends its decision by saying that it was protecting
the "Government's own long-run interest as a reliable contracting
partner in the myriad workaday transaction of its agencies." '4 While
this analysis is certainly accurate as far as it goes, it does not go
very far in this context. As explained below, the statement that the
Winstar decision protected the government's reputation as a reliable
contracting party was accurate in ways probably not contemplated
by the Court. But to claim that these extraordinary contracts between
the thrifts and the thrift regulators were ordinary and could therefore
be compared with a government procurement contract or a contract
to sell federal property is a real stretch. The very purpose of the
capital requirements in place before FIRREA (and strengthened in
the legislation itself) was to make thrift operators bear the conse-
quences of their risky activities. The Winstar decision undermined
Congress' ability to accomplish this legitimate statutory purpose.
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that the FSLIC lacked
the authority to make the deals it made. First, the FSLIC had the
authority to guarantee an insured institution against losses realized
in mergers and in asset purchases with other institutions.4' But there
was no statutory grant of authority permitting regulators to fail to
recognize such losses in the first place through accounting gim-
mickry. Similarly, while the FSLIC was authorized to permit thrifts
to count goodwill (and subordinated debt) to meet regulatory capital
31 Id at 2453.
19 Id at 2458-59.
40 Id at 2459.
4112 USC § 1729(f)12)(A)Iiii) 1988) (repealed 1989).
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and reserve requirements,42 nothing permitted the FSLIC arbitrarily
to change the meaning of these precise, technical terms.
Indeed, the use of these terms in the statute suggests that Congress
meant for them to be construed by the regulators with some fidelity
to their generally understood meanings. Similarly, the regulations
permitting the Bank Board to determine the capital levels to be
required of FSLIC insured institutions suggests that Congress
expected that these institutions would indeed be required to have
some capital.43
In other words, the decision in Winstar provided constitutional-
level protection for highly suspect deals made by highly politicized
bureaucrats in concert with well-connected bankers. The bankers
received what they sought-bargains and regulatory loopholes. The
bureaucrats received political support, and they were able to avoid
having the true dimensions of the thrift debacle recognized on their
watches, by delaying and denying the true size of the losses.
There is little doubt that the contracts between the Bank Board
and thrift operators, such as those involved in Winstar, were not
consistent with the public interest. These agreements, as outlined
above, aggravated the decline of the thrift industry by dramatically
increasing the levels of moral hazard and financial risk (leverage) in
an already fragile and over-regulated industry. FDICIA, by contrast,
addressed the causes of the thrift debacle, and, along with FIRREA
represented a bold decision to restore public confidence in the bank-
ing industry in general and the system of bank regulation in particu-
lar. But these statutes also deprived the thrift industry of the benefits
of the deals they had struck with regulators.
The Winstar decision provides an important window on the
mechanics of the dynamic relationship between Congress, adminis-
trative agencies, and the federal judiciary. An earlier Congress had
created a regulatory structure in which the (once) powerful thrift
industry was provided with a malleable and corruptible agency ripe
for capture. As I noted in another context, "long after there was any
economic need for a savings and loan industry, thrift regulators took
extraordinary steps to ensure the industry's survival. The regulators
acted as they did, not to further the public interest, but because they
understood that the survival of the industry was crucial to their own
professional survival." 44 The actions of the thrift regulators in cod-
dling the interests of the industry at the expense of the public, while
42 12 USC § 1730h(d) (1988) (repealed 1989).
," S Rep No 100-19, 100th Cong, 1st Sess 55 (1987), reprinted in 1987 USCCAN
489, 545.
"Macey, Organizational Design at 97 (cited in note 3).
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extreme, were consistent with the cozy regulatory structure of the
thrift industry, which was organized so as to permit the industry to
manipulate the regulatory structure to achieve desired outcomes.
At the outset of this article, I identified three ways that the con-
tracting problems between interest groups and politicians are likely
to manifest themselves. Winstar shows how the contracting parties
can craft legislation to mitigate these problems.
The first problem is a simple monitoring problem. The principals
(politicians) cannot monitor thrift regulators costlessly. There were
substantial direct monitoring costs, and even more substantial indi-
rect costs in the form of political risk from constituents who would
be outraged at the behavior of politicians such as the senators known
as the "Keating Five," who tried to obtain regulatory forbearance
from the thrift regulators on behalf of large contributors. To a very
large extent, the thrift industry solved this problem by creating a
captured regulatory agency whose allegiance to the industry was
strong and unchallenged by rivals. The Depression-era Congress that
created this cozy regulatory environment captured all of the initial
rents from the promulgation of this law.
In addition to the agency cost issue described above, there is the
similar problem of bureaucratic drift. Bureaucratic drift describes
the risk that an interest group might not be able to retain control
of an agency once it is created. But, in the context of the thrift
industry, we see that the very design of the agency itself tied it to
its constituency. Because the thrift regulators had responsibility for
a single industry, their fate was tied to the fate of that industry. This
structure all but ensured the capture of the agency by the industry,
which, of course, is exactly what happened.
Finally, of course, when the thrift industry obtained its cozy regu-
latory structure back in 1933, there was the danger that a subsequent
Congress might change its mind and undo some of the cozy arrange-
ments put into place by the bureaucrats. And, of course, this is
exactly what FIRREA and FDICIA accomplished in the thrift indus-
try. The entire corrupt regulatory infrastructure was dismantled as
the costs of the thrift bail-out both weakened the lobbying power
of the thrift operators, and made the savings and loan industry a
salient political issue for the first time in its history.
Because of these features, Winstar provides an excellent forum
for testing the highly controversial Landes and Posner thesis about
the role of an independent judiciary in the rent-seeking context.4"
"s William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J L & Econ 875 (1975).
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The Landes and Posner thesis is that an independent judiciary, such
as the one that exists in the United States (where judges enjoy consti-
tutional protections such as life-time tenure and are otherwise insu-
lated from the political process), also contributes to the resolution
of the fundamental contracting problems that exist between interest
groups and politicians by providing durability to statutes, thereby
raising the value to interest groups of engaging in rent-seeking in
the first place.
Under the Landes and Posner approach, the independent judiciary
raises the value of rent-seeking by enforcing deals according to their
original terms. As Landes and Posner see it, in the absence of a
binding long-term contract, the enacting Congress cannot prevent
a subsequent Congress from amending legislative interest-group
deals in a way unfavorable to the winning coalition, or indeed from
repealing it altogether. Both the enacting Congress and the interest
group, however, incur substantial costs that "would not prove worth-
while if the legislation were to be altered unfavorably or repealed
within a few months or years." 46 Thus, repealing or changing legisla-
tion by subsequent Congresses
would reduce the present value of legislative protection to inter-
est groups in the future, and hence the enacting Congressmen's
welfare. Such a manifestation of congressional bad faith would,
by reducing the value of legislative protection to interest
groups, impose costs on the faithless Congressmen: the "price"
they could demand for enacting such legislation would be
lower.41
Landes and Posner's point is that the stability and continuity
necessary to enable interest-group politics to function is supplied in
part by the existence of an independent judiciary. The independent
judiciary supplies stability and continuity by interpreting and
applying legislation in accordance with the original legislative under-
standing. This interpretive technique facilitates interest group poli-
tics by supplying the critical feature of durability to the deals struck
between interest groups and legislatures.
It is, of course, clearly true that judges sometimes overturn or fail
to enforce the legislative deals made between interest groups and
legislatures. But this risk represents a cost of having an independent
judiciary. Landes and Posner take the view that these costs are out-
weighed by the benefit (to the politicians and interest groups) sup-
41 Id at 877.
47 Id at 877-78.
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plied by the deals that the judiciary protects against subsequent
efforts at legislative encroachment. In other words, the costs associ-
ated with the occasional situations in which judicial independence
results in over-turning some valued legislative deal are outweighed
by the benefits of having a "system in which interest groups will
have incentives to invest in legislation that yields them benefits
over an extended period of time.
48
Winstar at least partially supports the Landes and Posner analysis
of the independent judiciary. In Winstar, there was a clear attempt
by a legislature to renege on the terms of a prior legislative deal
with the thrift industry. Although the Court permitted a subsequent
Congress to alter the terms of the bargain with the interest group
through the passage of FIRREA, it imposed a very heavy cost for
doing so.
Moreover, the legislation that provided sustenance to the thrift
industry was very old. Specifically, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act, which created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was enacted
in 1932, 49 followed shortly thereafter by the Home Owners' Loan
Act of 1933,0 which authorized the Bank Board to charter and regu-
late federal savings and loan associations. In turn, these statutes
were followed in 1934 by the National Housing Act, which created
the FSLIC, the agency charged with insuring thrift deposits and
regulating all federally insured thrifts."' The mere fact that this
unwieldy and inefficient regulatory structure lasted for over half a
century until the collapse of the thrift industry itself is testimony
to the Landes and Posner durability thesis. Certainly, the durability
of this legislation came from somewhere, and the presence of an
independent judiciary clearly did no harm to the durability of the
legislation.
Of course, the independent judiciary was not the only, or even
the most important source of stability for the interest group bargains
reflected in the thrift regulations described above. Two other sources
of durability were more important. First, Congress has its own inter-
nal mechanisms for ensuring the stability of interest group bargains.
These include bicameralism and the committee system, both of
which make it difficult to change or repeal laws once they are made.
48 Id at 879.
" Pub L No 72-304, 47 Stat 725 (1932), codified as amended at 12 USC §§ 1421-
1449 (1988).
so Pub L No 73-43, 48 Stat 128 11933), codified as amended at 12 USC §§ 1461-
1470 (1988).
1l Pub L No 73-479, 48 Stat 1246 (1934), codified as amended at 12 USC §§ 1701-
1750g (1988).
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Bicameralism (along with the availability of a presidential veto and
other procedural devices such as the filibuster) raises the transaction
costs of changing or repealing previously enacted laws in a straight-
forward way.
The committee system is an ingenious method for solving the
problem of durability that confronts Congress. The committee sys-
tem provides a way for congressmen to "forego influence in certain
areas for additional influence in other areas, thereby increasing the
aggregate demand for their services from the particular interest
groups most influential in their home jurisdictions." 2 Legislators
do not seek committee assignments randomly. They seek those
assignments that are likely to have "the greatest marginal impact
over their electoral fortunes." 3 Consequently, it is not surprising
that there is a high correlation between the jurisdictions of particular
committees and the levels of support shown by the committees'
membership for the interest groups benefitted by the committee.
Congressmen on particular committees, "[flor a diversity of policy
areas... are indeed significantly above-average supporters of benefits
to the relevant interest group" affected by those committees. 4 In
other words, the committee system allows committee members to
specialize in the regulation of interest groups that are likely to pro-
vide them with the greatest political support. This, in turn, allows
them to maximize the political support they receive from these
groups. In the context of thrift regulation this meant that all the
thrift industry had to do to keep its legislative program in place was
to retain control of the congressional membership of the relevant
congressional committees. Once this was done, those committees
could keep legislation reforming the thrift industry from coming to
a vote.
As noted above, in addition to the internal rules of Congress, the
regulation of the thrift industry itself was structured so as to promote
the longevity of the relevant legislation. The fact that the industry
enjoyed its own regulator was significant. The industry was not
competing with other banking and financial interests for the support
of its regulators. And this single constituency structure all but
assured that the agency, staffed with "experts" from within the
industry itself (and whose futures lay within the industry), would
be captured by the thrift operators it was purportedly regulating. The
52 Macey, Public Choice at 55 Icited in note 9).
'3 Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress, 96 J Pol Econ 132, 145 (1988).
54 Id at 151.
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independent judiciary simply supplemented these other mechanisms
for promoting the longevity of the thrift legislation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The focus of this article is a positive analysis of the Court's behavior
in Winstar, rather than a normative explanation of what it should
have done. However, it is clear that an argument can be made that
courts should be responsive to public choice concerns and ensure
that legislation serves the public interest."5 Courts ought to be sensi-
tive to issues of administrative agency capture and try to respond
by invalidating legislation and the bargains it entails when such
capture is present. Short of invalidating special-interest legislation,
courts can also use their tools to interpret statutes so that they serve
as public-regarding instruments. Similarly, courts should attempt to
uphold legislative acts that appear to be public regarding rather than
serving only private interests at the expense of the public. Laws
should serve some public purpose.
While I am not under the illusion that courts should be expected
to police the policy choices of legislatures or displace their constitu-
tional role, courts should be responsible for ensuring that law serves
public ends. The public-regarding nature of the Constitution permits
judges to use traditional methods of statutory interpretation to play
a role in regulating the activities of special interests.16 The Court in
Winstar does not even consider its role in ensuring that the govern-
ment contracts it upholds serve public ends. Had the Court engaged
in such an analysis, the exclusively private interest bargain repre-
sented in that case could have been exposed and invalidated.
This article has analyzed the Winstar case from a public choice
perspective. The Winstar decision was the culmination of a very
long process that began with the creation during the Depression era
of an elaborate regulatory infrastructure that nurtured and protected
the thrift industry long after it became obsolete as a result of changes
in the nature of the mortgage market caused by technological
advances. For decades, the assets of thrift institutions consisted of
long-term, fixed rate mortgages, that provided neither diversification
nor protection from interest rate risk. When competition from other
" Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223 (1986) ("Macey, Pro-
moting Public-Regarding Legislation"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregula-
tion: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 Tulane L Rev 849, 849 (1980). See also
Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining With the State (Princeton, 1993).
56 Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation at 240-50 (cited in note 55).
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sources of capital for housing finance materialized, particularly from
mortgage originators who were able to securitize the cash flows
associated with mortgage repayments, the thrift industry was unable
to respond. Similarly, when interest rates rose, the costs of funding
the thrifts' liabilities, which came in the form of short term deposits,
increased to the point at which these costs exceeded the revenues
associated with the medium and long-term mortgages on the asset
side of the thrifts' balance sheets.
In an industry subject to normal market forces, these firms would
have re-engineered their operations or faced insolvency. But the thrift
regulators were able to shift the costs of this industry-wide, systemic
inefficiency by rapidly and dramatically expanding the scope of per-
missible thrift investment powers to include such things as direct
investments in speculative real estate, funded, of course, by federally
insured deposits. When this moral hazard led, predictably, to irre-
sponsible risk taking, and shortly thereafter to insolvency, the regula-
tors responded again, this time by weakening the requirements that
thrifts maintain adequate capital and reserves as a condition for
continued operation. This, of course, simply exacerbated the moral
hazard problem, leading to more speculation, and more insolvency.
Moreover, one way that the moral hazard manifested itself was in
explosive growth by many of the most recklessly managed thrifts.
This explosive growth was due to the reduction in required capital
and reserves, which permitted thrifts to grow without increasing
their capital base. The final move by the regulators in the face of
mounting thrift failures during the 1980s was to merge insolvent
thrifts into solvent thrifts, promising regulatory forbearance from
capital requirements to the healthy institutions that were making
these acquisitions. These accounting gimmicks, of course, attracted
merger partners that were themselves undercapitalized and inter-
ested in taking on risks (with taxpayer money) in the hopes of getting
lucky. 7
The incredible losses associated with this inept, sometimes cor-
rupt, regulation of the thrift industry led to public outrage, and to
a serious erosion of the political power of the thrift industry. This,
in turn, led to the phenomenon of "coalition drift" described in
this article. The coalition in Congress that had supported the thrift
industry for decades was no longer willing to associate itself with
the industry. Similarly, the bankruptcy of the FSLIC insurance fund
led to "bureaucratic drift" of the kind discussed above. Indeed, since
" For a discussion of why moral hazard problems should be expected, especially
in relation to banking, see Macey & Miller, Banking Law at 280-83 (cited in note
23).
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the bureaucracy was bankrupt, it literally drifted into oblivion, and
was eliminated as a source of further support for the thrift operators.
The result was dramatic legislation to reorganize the regulatory
infrastructure of the thrift industry. One major piece of this legisla-
tive program, FIRREA, eliminated the special accounting treatment
for merged thrifts, which in turn caused a number of thrifts to find
themselves suddenly out of compliance with government capital
requirements. Facing failure or significant recapitalization costs,
these firms sued the government, claiming that the contracts they
had made with the thrift regulators had been thwarted by FIRREA.
This litigation ultimately produced the Supreme Court opinion in
Winstar.
The Winstar Court validated the shady deals made between the
captured regulators of the thrift industry and the thrift operators for
whose benefit the regulatory scheme had been created. This decision,
in turn, validates the Landes and Posner thesis about the role of
the independent judiciary in a rent-seeking society. The opinion in
Winstar facilitates the rent-seeking process by providing durability
and stability to the deals struck between interest groups and politi-
cians. The judiciary in this case permitted the captured regulators
to triumph over a subsequent Congress by continuing the benefits
of a special-interest group bargain struck between the thrift industry
and Congress during the 1930s.
The Winstar opinion similarly expands the power of the adminis-
trative state by permitting politically unaccountable bureaucrats to
tie the hands of Congress. This article makes the point that this
opinion actually benefits Congress by increasing the demand by
interest groups for legislative wealth transfers. The durability con-
ferred on interest group bargains by the Winstar approach to con-
tracts between agencies and interest groups will increase the demand
on the part of other interest groups for protectionist regulation. Thus,
far from being a decision that promotes efficiency by enforcing con-
tractual commitments, Winstar reduces societal welfare by lowering
the transaction costs to interest groups of engaging in rent-seeking.
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